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TRANSPARENTNOST ROZPOČTU A FISKÁLNÍ VÝKONNOST: MAJÍ OTEVŘENÉ 
ROZPOČTY VLIV? 
Lucie Sedmihradská a Jakub Haas 
Abstract  
Existing published research of the relationship between budget transparency and fiscal performance 
confirms the expectations that higher budget transparency is associated with smaller budget deficits 
and lower public debt. However, our previous research did not bring such clear results and raised a 
fundamental question: Why should greater transparency improve fiscal performance? The objective 
of the proposed paper is to evaluate the relationship between budget transparency and fiscal 
performance.  
Based on the literature review we have identified three channels through which increased 
transparency may limit excessive public expenditures resulting in budget deficit and public debt: (1) 
reduce fiscal illusion, (2) decrease information asymmetry between politicians and voters which 
may improve accountability and increase political competition, and (3) strengthen the enforcement 
of fiscal rules. The results of statistical analysis (conditional means analysis for 2008 and 
correlation and regression analysis for 2003 to 2009) did not prove any significant negative 
relationship between budget transparency, measured by the Open Budget Index, and budget deficit 
or public debt. We also found positive and statistically significant relation between corruption and 
budget transparency. 
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Abstrakt 
Stávající výzkum vztahu transparentnosti rozpočtu a fiskální výkonnosti potvrzuje očekávání, že 
vyšší transparentnost rozpočtu souvisí s menším rozpočtovým deficitem nižším a veřejným dluhem. 
Náš předchozí výzkum nepřinesl tak jednoznačné výsledky a otevřel zásadní otázku: Proč by měla 
vyšší transparentnost zlepšovat fiskální výkonnost? Cílem tohoto článku je zhodnotit vztah mezi 
transparentností rozpočtu a fiskální výkonností. 
Na základě obsahové analýzy literatury jsou identifikovány tři procesy, díky kterým může větší 
transparentnost omezit nadměrné veřejné výdaje vedoucí k rozpočtovému deficitu a veřejnému 
dluhu: (1) omezení fiskální iluze, (2) snížení informační asymetrie mezi politiky a voliči, která 
zvýší odpovědnost politiků a konkurenci mezi politiky a (3) posílení vymahatelnosti fiskálních 
pravidel. Výsledky statistické analýzy (analýza podmíněných průměrů pro rok 2008 a korelační a 
regresní analýza pro období 2003-2009) nepotvrdily existenci významného negativního vztahu mezi 
transparentností rozpočtu měřenou Indexem otevřeného rozpočtu a rozpočtovým deficitem a 
veřejným dluhem. Současně jsme potvrdili statisticky významný pozitivní vztah transparentností 
rozpočtu a mezi mírou korupce. 
Klíčová slova: transparentnost rozpočtu, fiskální výkonnost, Index otevřeného rozpočtu 
Introduction 
Existing published research of the relationship between budget transparency and fiscal performance 
confirms the expectations that budget transparency is associated with smaller budget deficits and 
lower public debt. However, our previous research (see Sedmihradská, Haas and Štefek, 2011) did 
not bring such clear results and raised a fundamental question: Why should greater budget 
transparency improve fiscal performance? 
The objective of the paper is to evaluate the relationship between budget transparency and fiscal 
performance. In order to fulfill this objective we raised and answered four research questions: 
1. What are the main reasons for excessive public expenditures resulting in budget deficit and 
public debt and how can these be limited by improved budget transparency? 
2. What kinds of relationships were proved in the published research so far? 
3. Do countries with higher ranking in the Open Budget Survey show lower budget deficit or 
smaller public debt?  
4. Is higher corruption connected with lower budget transparency? 
In order to answer the first two questions we underwent a detailed literature review. The answer of 
the third question is based on statistical analysis (conditional means analysis for 2008 and 
correlation and regression analysis for 2003 to 2009). Budget transparency is measured by the Open 
Budget Index and fiscal performance data are from the International Monetary Fund (2011). The 
fourth question will be answered using data of Transparency International. 
The next section of the paper deals with the relationship of fiscal institutions, budget transparency 
and fiscal performance and shows three channels through which increased transparency may limit 
excessive public expenditures resulting in budget deficit and public debt. It also summarizes the 
results of the existing research of budget transparency impact on fiscal performance. The third 
section describes the data and methods used and the fourth section presents and discusses the results 
of the provided analysis. Last section concludes. 
1. Fiscal institutions, budget transparency and fiscal performance 
Extensive research of the effects of political and institutional factors on fiscal performance, such as 
public deficit and debt, took place in the last three decades. The obtained results without any doubts 
confirm that institutions matter.  
The term “institutions” is very broad and encompasses any rule or procedure which may influence 
the decision-making regarding public budgets. Among the constitutional institutions belong the 
ruses of elections or the form of government (see Persson and Tabellini, 2003). Budget institutions 
are rules and regulations according to which budges are prepared, approved and carried out (see 
Alesina and Perotti, 1999, p. 14), e.g., relationship between executive and legislature or existence of 
numerical targets or multiyear budgeting. A recent detailed review of the existing research about the 
relationship of institutions and fiscal performance and fiscal sustainability offers for example Rose 
(2010). 
Budget transparency is usually defined as full disclosure of all relevant fiscal information in a 
timely and systematic manner (see OECD, 2002). Kopits and Craig (1998) define fiscal 
transparency as “openness toward the public at large about government structure and functions, 
fiscal policy intentions, public sector accounts, and projections. It involves ready access to reliable, 
comprehensive, timely, understandable, and internationally comparable information on government 
activities (…)”1. Budget transparency is one of the features of the institutions shaping the 
environment of the budgetary process (see von Hagen, 2007, pp. 29 and 31).   
There are three main reasons for inefficiency of resource allocation which originates in the 
framework of the budgetary process: fiscal illusion, deficit bias and misuse of public funds (see von 
Hagen and Harden, 1994). The first two reasons are quite similar to each other: in both cases 
citizens underestimate the true price of public good which leads to oversupply of that good, i.e., to 
excessive public expenditures and consequent debt financing. In case of fiscal illusion citizens fail 
to recognize the total tax burden and in case of the deficit bias the future obligations are discounted 
at too high discount rate. The third reason is a consequence of the principal-agent relationship 
between citizens and politicians. 
The impact of fiscal illusion and the deficit bias is shown in Figure 1.1. P2 and Q2 show the tax 
price and the desired quantity of public good in case fiscal illusion is not present. The total budget 
(expenditures = revenues) is the area 0Q2aP2. In case of fiscal illusion or deficit bias the perceived 
price falls to P1, desired quantity grows to Q1. At this moment the perceived budget is the area 
0Q1cP1, however the real budget (expenditures) is 0Q1dP2. The area Q2Q1da is the excessive budget 
(expenditures – revenues = deficit). 
Figure 1.1: Fiscal illusion and deficit bias 
 
Source: Dollery and Worthington (1996, p. 263) 
Improved budget transparency could limit the difference between the real tax price P2 and the 
perceived tax price P1, which would lead to smaller excessive budget.  
The decision making process about public finances has the character of principal-agent relationship 
as the voters delegate the power to elected politicians. This creates a space for politicians to behave 
differently from voters desires. Improved transparency can limit this behavior through improved 
accountability and increased political competition (von Hagen, 2007, p. 37). 
Increased transparency enables voters to better understand the budget, i.e., the financial plan of the 
government, and to evaluate the actual performance of the government. It reduces information 
asymmetry: the more voters know about and understand the budget process the less politicians can 
act strategically and use fiscal deficits and excessive expenditures to achieve opportunistic goals. 
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Lack of budget transparency may increase voters’ confusion and reduce politicians’ commitment to 
be fiscally responsible (Benito and Bastida, 2009, p. 405). Thus the budget transparency increases 
the accountability of the politicians.  
Budget transparency may increase political competition as the conditions for both the incumbent 
(i.e., politicians currently in the office) and the competing candidates (i.e., currently in the 
opposition), will approach. The information advantage of the incumbent will decrease and the 
promises of the competing candidates will be more realistic (see von Hagen, 2007, p. 37). 
Nowadays, many countries use fiscal rules, such as expenditure ceilings, deficit targets or tax 
ceilings, as a tool to safeguard fiscal sustainability (see Joumard et al., 2003, p. 120). These fiscal 
rules can only lead to fiscal discipline if they are backed by transparent reporting. Otherwise they 
create various “perverse” incentives. Fiscal transparency is essential for enforcement of fiscal rules.  
The above presented arguments show that expectations that improved budget transparency is 
associated with better fiscal performance are justified. 
Table 1.1 lists four recent studies of the relationship between budget transparency and fiscal 
performance together with the summary of the applied methods and main findings. All of the 
studies were cross-sectional and took place between 1999 and 2005. Researching of the influence of 
budget transparency on fiscal performance requires establishment of a reliable budget transparency 
indicator, which would allow comparison across countries and time. All of the authors constructed 
their own budget transparency indicator using internationally comparable data sources (OECD 
questionnaire or database and IMF Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes - ROSCs). 
Results of comparison of different budget transparency indicators provided by De Simone (2009, 
Tab. 2) show, however, substantial differences among them. For example the correlation coefficient 
between index of Alt and Lassen (2003) and index of Benito and Bastida (2009) amounts to only 
0.316 and is statistically insignificant.  
Table 1.1: Existing research on the relationship between budget transparency and fiscal 
performance 
Authors 
Fiscal 
performance 
indicator 
Transparency 
indicator 
Countries Method Results 
Alt and 
Lassen 
(2003) 
General 
government 
debt per GDP 
(1999) 
Own indicator 
based on OECD 
questionnaire 
(1999) 
19 advanced 
Multiple 
regression  
Significant 
(0.05), negative, 
transparency and 
debt 
Benito and 
Bastida 
(2009) 
Government 
debt per GDP 
Budget balance 
per GDP 
(2003)  
Own indicator 
based on the 
OECD/World 
Bank Budgeting 
Database 
(2003) 
41 advanced 
and 
developing 
Correlation 
Significant 
(0.05), positive, 
transparency and 
budget balance 
Hameed 
(2005) 
Average fiscal 
balance over 
five years 
(2000-2004) 
Own indicator 
based on IMF 
ROSCs (2005) 
57 advanced 
and 
developing 
Multiple 
regression 
Significant 
(0.05), positive, 
transparency and 
average primary 
balance 
Jarmuzek 
(2006) 
General 
government 
debt per GDP 
Own indicator 
based on IMF 
ROSCs (2005) 
27 CEE 
countries 
Multiple 
regression 
Weak, negative, 
transparency and 
debt 
(2005) 
With only one exception (Jarmuzek, 2006) the studies have proved the expected relationship: better 
transparency is associated with higher budget balance (= lower budget deficit) and lower public 
debt. Jarmuzek (2006, p. 11) concludes that there is “no strong statistical evidence for importance of 
fiscal transparency”2 in the transition economies. 
2. Data and methods 
The data used in our analysis come from two sources: Data on fiscal transparency come from the 
results of the Open Budget Survey, which are available electronically at the web page of the Open 
Budget Partnership (2010a). Data on fiscal performance come from the International Monetary 
Fund (2011) World Economic Outlook Database from April 2011. 
For the purpose of evaluation of budget transparency we have used the Open Budget Index for the 
years 2006, 2008 and 2010. The Open Budget Index (OBI) is computed using the data from the 
Open Budget Survey which is compiled from a questionnaire completed for each country by 
independent budget experts who are not associated with the national government. The Survey in 
over 120 questions examines the availability of eight key budget documents and their 
comprehensiveness, the extent of oversight provided by legislatures and supreme audit institutions 
and opportunities available to the public to participate in national budget decision-making processes 
(see Open budget partnership, 2010).  
Descriptive statistics of OBI are shown in Table 2.1. During the analyzed years the number of the 
surveyed countries grew from 60 to 94 (93 analyzed, due to unavailability of fiscal data we have 
excluded East Timor from the analysis). The ranking of many countries has changed, sometimes 
substantially. This explains why the correlation coefficient is only between 0.747 and 0.827 for the 
OBI in different years. 
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of OBI 
 N Mean Min Max Std.Dev. 
Number of countries
1) 
Correlation 
scant or no minimal some significant extensive obi 2008 obi 2010 
obi2006 60 45.500 3 89 21.781 8 15 23 8 6 0.747*** 0.827*** 
obi2008 83 40.434 0 88 24.684 23 15 26 15 4  0.802*** 
obi2010 93 42.301 0 92 24.644 22 18 33 13 7 0.802***  
Note: *** correlation is significant at 0.01 % 
1)
 Based on the OBI countries are divided into 5 groups: scant or no (0-20), minimal (21-40), some 
(41-60), significant (61-80) and extensive (81-100) (see Open budget partnership, 2010). 
Fiscal performance was evaluated using relevant indicators available in the International Monetary 
Fund (2011) World Economic Outlook Database. The following table lists the applied variables 
together with a short description. 
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Table 2.2: Fiscal performance variables 
Subject Descriptor Subject Notes Units 
General 
government gross 
debt 
Gross debt consists of all liabilities that require payment or 
payments of interest and/or principal by the debtor to the creditor 
at a date or dates in the future.  
Percent 
of GDP 
General 
government net 
lending/borrowing 
Net lending (+)/ borrowing (-) is calculated as revenue minus total 
expenditure. 
Percent 
of GDP 
General 
government 
primary net 
lending/borrowing 
Primary net lending/borrowing is net lending (+)/borrowing (-) 
plus net interest payable/paid. 
Percent 
of GDP 
Gross domestic 
product per capita, 
current prices 
GDP is expressed in current U.S. dollars per person. Data are 
derived by first converting GDP in national currency to U.S. 
dollars and then dividing it by total population. 
U.S. 
dollars 
Gross domestic 
product, constant 
prices 
Annual percentages of constant price GDP are year-on-year 
changes;  the base year is country-specific. 
Percent 
change 
Unemployment 
rate 
Unemployment rate can be defined by either the national 
definition, the ILO harmonized definition ("unemployed" are 
those who are currently not working but are willing and able to 
work for pay, and have actively searched for work), or the OECD 
harmonized definition (unemployment rate gives the number of 
unemployed persons as a percentage of the labor force).  
Percent 
of total 
labor 
force 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2011), World Economic Outlook Database 
Missing data were supplied from Eurostat in case of unemployment rate for Bulgaria and Sweden 
and in case of general government primary net lending/borrowing for Poland and Romania. Data of 
unemployment rate for Turkey come from OECD. 
The year of the OBI indicator is the year of its publishing, however, the evaluation reflects the 
transparency of the budget document for one or two years before publishing, thus the OBI 2006 
reflects the situation in 2004 and 2005 for most of the countries. As the OBI is published biannually 
we use the same OBI for two years. 
We have used multiple methods in order to find out whether there is a relationship between budget 
transparency and budget balance and public debt.  
First we have focused on the cross-sectional research: We have undertaken analysis of conditional 
means for the year 2008 and correlation analysis for the years 2004-2009 in the software 
STATISTICA 7.1.  
For the longitudinal research we have decided to estimate, similarly to our previous research (see 
Nitschová, 2001) the model of Roubini and Sachs (1989), which allows evaluation of the factors 
influencing annual budget deficit (i.e., the change of the debt to GDP ratio): 
ititititittiit vOBIaudaqdardabdaabd ..... 54321.10 ,    (1) 
where  
- d(bit) is the difference between general government gross debt as a % of GDP in the years t a t-1;  
- d(bi,t-1) is the difference between general government gross debt as a % of GDP in the years t-1 
and t-2; 
- d(rit) is difference between the real interest rate in the years t and t-1
3
; 
- d(qit) is the difference in the percent change of the gross domestic product in constant prices in the 
years t and t-1; 
- d(uit) is the difference in the unemployment rate in the years t and t-1; and 
- OBIit is the Open Budget Index. 
For estimation of the model we have used fixed-effects models analysis in the software Gretl 1.9.2.  
For the measuring relation between corruption and public budget transparency we use Corruption 
Perceptions Index which is published by Transparency International every year. It can reach values 
from 0 (the highest rate of corruption) to 10 (the lowest rate). We have undertaken correlation 
analysis for the years 2006, 2008 and 2010 in the software STATISTICA 7.1.  
3. Results 
There are first presented the results of the cross-sectional analysis of the relationship between 
budget transparency measured by the OBI and budget balance and public deficit and then the 
estimates of the equation (1). 
The figure of the conditional means shows that the budget balance is decreasing (i.e., budget surplus 
turns into budget deficit between the countries with extensive (1) and significant (2) budget 
transparency) with the exception of the group of countries with scant or no transparency, which 
shows the highest budget balance. Regarding the fact, that these countries provide hardly any fiscal 
data, the quality of the provided data is quite questionable. Analysis of variance proved that there 
are significant differences in the budget balance among the five groups and the LSD (least 
significant difference) test proved that differences between the last group (5) and all the remaining 
groups but the first one (i.e., 2, 3 and 4) are significant at 5 % level. The analysis of the conditional 
means of the public deficit did not prove any significant differences between the groups of countries 
based on their transparency level. 
Figure 3.1: Average budget balance and public debt in different transparency groups (2008) 
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 First, we have calculated the interests paid (as a % of GDP) as the difference between general government net 
lending/borrowing and general government primary net lending/borrowing (both as a % of GDP). Second, we have 
calculated the nominal interest rate as a share of the interests paid in public debt (both as a % of GDP). Third we have 
adjusted the nominal interest rate for inflation. 
 Note: Outliners, i.e. budget surplus above 20 % of GDP (1 case), budget deficit above 10 % of GDP 
(1 case) and public debt above 80 % of GDP (4 cases), are not shown in order to keep the figures 
well arranged. 
Based on the OBI countries are divided into 5 groups: 1=extensive (81-100), 2=significant (61-80), 
3=some (41-60), 4=minimal (21-40) and 5=scant or no (0-20). 
Table 3.1 shows the results of the correlations between OBI and budget balance (general 
government net lending/borrowing) and OBI and public debt (general government gross debt) for  
the years 2004 and 2009. In bold there are marked the years when the relationship had the expected 
signed (+ for budget balance and – for public debt). The results are not statistically significant at the 
5% level with only two exceptions – budget balance in 2006 and 2008. However, in these cases the 
sign is wrong. 
Table 3.1: Correlation results: Budget balance and government debt (% GDP) and OBI 
(2004-2009) 
Y X r(X,Y) r2 t p N  
balance2004 obi2006 0.0548 0.0030 0.4178 0.6777 60 Y=-1.7635+0.0091*X 
balance2005 obi2006 -0.0041 0.0000 -0.0314 0.9750 60 Y=-0.2299-0.0009*X 
balance2006 obi2008 -0.302*** 0.0912 -2.8502 0.0055 83 Y=6.4878-0.1074*X 
balance2007 obi2008 0.0253 0.0006 0.2280 0.8202 83 Y=1.0954+0.0146*X 
balance2008 obi2010 -0.242*** 0.0585 -2.3789 0.0195 93 Y=2.4029-0.0637*X 
balance2009 obi2010 0.1204 0.0145 1.1569 0.2503 93 Y=-6.1568+0.0208*X 
debt2004 obi2006 -0.1846 0.0341 -1.3415 0.1857 53 Y=66.1715-0.2524*X 
debt2005 obi2006 -0.1901 0.0361 -1.3964 0.1685 54 Y=62.0766-0.2468*X 
debt2006 obi2008 0.1129 0.0127 0.9774 0.3315 76 Y=38.1844+0.1877*X 
debt2007 obi2008 0.1211 0.0147 1.0494 0.2974 76 Y=33.8007+0.1361*X 
debt2008 obi2010 0.0241 0.0006 0.2209 0.8257 86 Y=38.341+0.0262*X 
debt2009 obi2010 0.0508 0.0026 0.4659 0.6425 86 Y=41.2135+0.0571*X 
Note: *** correlation is significant at 0.01 % 
The results of the estimation of equation (1) presented in Table 3.2 show that the model predicts 
quite well the budget deficit and that all the independent variables have the right sign, i.e., the 
budget deficit is higher in case economy slows down, unemployment and interest rate increases and 
high budget deficit in the previous year. The impact of budget transparency is negative, i.e., higher 
transparency is associated with lower budget deficit. However, our results do not allow us to reject 
the null hypothesis that budget transparency does not influence budget deficit. 
Table 3.2: Fixed-effects estimates of budget deficit - d(bit) (18 cross-sectional units
1)
, 6 time 
periods, 108 observations) 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 const 6.2694 
 
6.6811 
 
6.3652 
 
 
(4.5737) 
 
 
(4.2897) 
 
 
(4.2995) 
 
 q(t) -0.3169 ***  -0.3146 *** -0.3039 *** 
 
(0.0850) 
 
 
(0.0842) 
 
 
(0.0841) 
 
 u(t) 2.0052 *** 2.0271 *** 2.0914 *** 
 
(0.3420) 
 
 
(0.3305) 
 
 
(0.3280) 
 
 r(t) 0.1038 
 
0.1046 
   
 
(0.0811) 
 
 
(0.0806) 
 
   OBI -0.1151 
 
-0.1225 * -0.1174 
 
 
(0.0763) 
 
 
(0.0708) 
 
 
(0.0710) 
 
 b(t-1) 0.0268 
     
 
(0.0989) 
     
       Adjusted R-squared 0.5809 
 
0.5854 
 
0.5821 
 Durbin-Watson statistic 2.1197 
 
2.0829 
 
2.0962 
 Note: std. error reported in parenthesis, *** significant at 0.01 %, * significant at 0.1 % 
1)
 Brazil, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Egypt, France, Chad, Jordan, Nepal, 
Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States,  
In contrary to most of the previous research we did not confirm a clear relationship between budget 
transparency and budget deficit or public debt. The main contribution of our paper is the 
longitudinal design of the research and the application of an independent, internationally recognized 
measure of budget transparency. 
The weakest point of the research is the selection of the countries in the longitudinal research. 
While the cross-sectional research (correlation analysis) included 53 to 93 countries, i.e. six or 
seven countries were missing, there were included only 18 countries in the longitudinal research 
(regression analysis) and this selection was purely dependent on the availability of the whole set of 
fiscal and economic data.  
The answer on the fourth question is obvious from the Table 3.3. We see strong correlation between 
corruption and public budget transparency with undoubtful statistical significance in all three years 
with available data. This finding confirms aspect of the misuse of the public funds (see von Hagen 
and Harden, 1994). 
Table 3.3: Corruption Perceptions Index and Open Budget Index 
Year No.of countries Corr.coeff. p-value 
2006 59 0,7052 0,000 
2008 78 0,5029 0,000 
2010 92 0,6532 0,000 
Conclusions 
There are at least three channels through which increased transparency may limit excessive public 
expenditures resulting in budget deficit and public debt: (1) reduction of fiscal illusion, (2) decrease 
of information asymmetry between politicians and voters which may improve accountability and 
increase political competition, and (3) stronger enforcement of fiscal rules. However, the results of 
statistical analysis which combined conditional means analysis for 2008 and correlation and 
regression analysis for 2003 to 2009 did not prove any significant negative relationship between 
budget transparency, measured by the Open Budget Index, and budget deficit or public debt. We 
also found strong and statistically significant relation between corruption and public finance 
transparency. 
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